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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

concluding

that

the

automobile delivered did not conform to the contract, and
thereby allowed rejection of its delivery.

If delivery was accepted, whether the trial court erred in
concluding that the automobile did not conform, and that its
non-conformity substantially impaired its value and that the
defects were not discoverable before acceptance, and thereby
allowed revocation of the acceptance.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the automobile
was not consideration for the contract and therefore was
voidable for failure of consideration.

Whether the trial court erred in ruljing as a matter of law
that the exclusion or disclaimer of warranties in an "as is"
sale is unconscionable.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment that the contract was unconscionable.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OK MOTORS, INC. d/b/a
MOUNTAIN MOTORS
Plaintiff—Appellant
Civil No. 870216-CA
Category No. 14b

vs.
CHARLES P. HILL
Defendant—Respondent

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Appeal from Judgment, May 4, 1987
Eighth Circuit Court, Utah County
Honorable E. Patrick McGuire, Circuit Judge
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

is conferred

on the Utah

Court of Appeals

pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3c (Supp. 198$).
STATEMENT OF NATURE OP PROCEEDINGS
The plaintiff—appellant, Mountain Rotors, filed a complaint
against the defendant—respondent, Charles P. Hill, for breach of
contract, seeking payment for an automobile and other appropriate
damages (R. 1-2). The defendant's Answer and Counterclaim denied
that the defendant breached contract and claimed the plaintiff
breached contract (R. 5-12).

Defendant then filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment (R. 95-96).
This appeal is from an order, entered in the Eighth Circuit
Court on the 4th of May, 1987, granting defendant's motion for
1

summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint (R. 129131).

Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal as directed by the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure on the 3rd of June, 1987 (R. 132-133).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutory provisions relevant to the determination of
the present case are found in the Utah Uniform Commercial Code,
Title 70A of the Utah Code Annotated.

Relevant portions of these

provisions are reproduced verbatim in Addendum "A".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
It

is

undisputed

defendant—respondent,

that

on

Charles

or
P.

about
Hill

December
went

to

17, 1985,
plaintiff—

appellant, Mountain Motors, for the purpose of purchasing an
automobile.

On that same day, defendant inspected and test drove

a used 1981 Volkswagen Rabbit.

Two days later, on December 19,

having inspected the automobile again, defendant bargained-for
its purchase on an "as is" basis, signed his agreement to such a
statement (attached as Addendum "B"), and accepted delivery of
the automobile.

In exchange, plaintiff accepted a check for

$2,642.88 including tax and license (R. 21-23, 75-77, 90-92).
On December 19, having accepted delivery of the automobile,
the defendant drove it approximately 50 miles when it developed
mechanical problems and became inoperable (R. 78-79).
on the shoulder of the road, he called his wife.

Leaving it

Mrs. Hill then

contacted Mountain Motors, informed plaintiff that the vehicle
was broken down on the freeway, and demanded that they repair it.
Mountain Motors' secretary, Stacy Dixon, advised Mrs. Hill that,
2

since her boss wasn't in the office, she didn't know exactly what
could be done, but gave Mrs. Hill three examples of what might be
done.

However, nothing was promised to h|er (R. 25-27, 116-117).

Subsequently, the defendant stopped payment on his check.
After payment was stopped, Sarkas Barakat, president of Mountain
Motors, contacted

Mrs. Hill and askec^ that payment be made

honoring the contract, reminding her that the car was sold "as
is" and that the defendant had been informed he was responsible
for any defects even if the car was "brtought back in a basket"
(R. 22, 25, 117-118).

The defendant refused to pay for the car.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This court should rule in favor of tjhe plaintiff—appellant,
Mountain Motors, and reverse the trial cpurt's decision to grant
defendant's—respondent's,

Mr.

Hill's^

motion

for

summary

judgment for the following reasons.
First, defendant purchased on an "as is" basis the 1981
Volkswagen

Rabbit

(R.

22-23,

57-58,

60), which

effectively

disclaimed all express and implied warranties under U.C.A. § 70A2-316(1-3)

(Supp.

1987).

Accordingly,

the defendant

responsible for all mechanical defects ^ind repairs.

became

The Oregon

Court of Appeals, in Clark v. Ford Motqr Co. , 46 Or. App. 521,
612 P.2d 564 (1982), ruled in a case directly on point that an
automobile purchased "as is", "by definition", cannot be nonconforming.

Public policy encourages the freedom to include

disclaimers of warranties in contracts, Allowing buyer and seller
the right to determine the allocation o£ each party's risks and
costs.

Defendant accepted the automobile, "as is", after having
3

had the opportunity to inspect and test drive it over a two day
period (R. 21-23, 75-77).

His acceptance served to disallow his

opportunity to subsequently reject delivery.

He received what he

bargained-for, an automobile which conformed to an "as is" sale.
Second, revocation of acceptance also cannot be allowed on
the

basis

that

the

automobile

conforms

mentioned in the first reason.

to the

contract as

However, if the automobile was

found by the trier of fact to be non-conforming, the trial
court's decision should still be reversed because the defect did
not substantially impair the value of the car to the defendant,
given his particular
required.
assumed

circumstances

considered

objectively

as

It is only reasonable for the defendant to have
that

an

"as

is"

car

might

develop

problems.

Nevertheless, even if the defect did substantially impair its
value to him, he has not proven the defect was undiscoverable or
that he relied on seller's assurances in accepting the car.
Third, consideration of the automobile is valid under an "as
is" sale because the automobile is conforming "by definition".
Consideration is not lacking just because the defendant is not
satisfied with what he bargained-for.
Fourth,
disclaimers

U.C.A.
of

unconscionable

§

70A-2-316

warranties,
per

se.

and

allows

for

therefore,

exclusions
they

The Utah Supreme Court

are

or
not

in Resource

Management Corp. v. Western Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028
(Utah 1985) identified various tests that could be used to show
unconscionability.

However, none of those tests were satisfied

in this case and the principle of the prevention of oppression
4

and unfair surprise would not be furthered by allowing an "as is"
contract to be declared unconscionable.
Finally, summary judgment should only be granted when it is
clear from the undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable
to the opposing party, that the opposing party cannot prevail on
the basis of the applicable law.

While the facts are basically

undisputed in this case, the applicable law, for the reasons
stated above, favors the plaintiff.

Fi^rthermore, in Haucren v.

Ford Motor Co. . 219 N.W.2d 462, 464 (N.|D. 1974) and Butcher v.
Garrett-Enumclaw Co. , 20 Wash. App. 36|1, 581 P.2d 1352, 1357
(1978), the courts ruled that unconscion^bility cannot be decided
on a motion for summary judgment and that the issue must be
returned to receive evidence of the commercial setting.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE AUTOMOBILE DID CONFORM TO THE C0NTRACT AND THE DELIVERY
OF THE AUTOMOBILE WAS ACCEPTED.
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code, in U.C.A. § 70A-2-601

(1980), provides that a buyer may, air^ong other alternatives,
reject goods if they in any way fail to conform to the contract.
However, in this case, the automobile did conform to the contract
and the delivery of the automobile was accepted.
A.

The automobile did conform to the "As Is" contract
which disclaimed all warranties.

Under

U.C.A.

§

70A-2-106(2)

(19^0),

"Goods

or

conduct

including any act of a performance are conforming or conform to
the contract when they are in accordanjce with the obligations
under the contract."
5

It is undisputed that on December 19, 1985, the defendant,
Mr. Hill, signed a "buyer's guide", developed by the Federal
Trade

Commission

to

better

establish

buyer

and

seller

responsibilities, which specified that the 1981 Volkswagen Rabbit
was being purchased on an "as is", no warranty basis (R. 21-23,
75-77, 90-92).
conspicuously

Accordingly, the plaintiff, Mountain Motors,
disclaimed

warranties

of

permitted

under

all

express

merchantability
U.C.A.

§

and

warranties
fitness

70A-2-316(l-3)

for

(Supp.

and

implied

purpose
1987).

as
In

International Petroleum Services v. A & N Well Service, 230 Kan.
452, 639 P.2d 29

(1982), the Kansas court ruled, applying a

statute similar to that adopted by Utah, that implied warranties
are disclaimed and may not arise in the sale of used goods when
the goods are sold "as is".

See, Yanish v. Fernandez, 156 Colo.

225, 397 P.2d 881 (1965); Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford,
681 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1984).
A case directly on point with the case before this court is
Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 58 Or. App. 521, 612 P.2d 316

(1980).

In that case, the Oregon Appellate court found that a used car
sold "as is" cannot be found to be non-conforming "by definition"
because the buyer received exactly what he bargained-for.

Again,

in International Petroleum Services, 230 Kan. 452, 639 P.2d at
30, the court stated that a buyer's knowledge that the goods are
used, the extent of their use, and whether they are discounted
may help to determine the standards of quality applied to the
transaction.

With these cases in mind, it follows that a used

automobile, sold "as is" and disclaiming all implied warranties,
6

should not be found non-conforming, "by definition", since the
obligations bargained-for don't include any warranties.
In the dicta of an Illinois Appellate case cited by the
defendant (R. 103), Blankenship v. Northern Ford, 95 111. App. 3d
303, 420 N.E.2d 167, 171 (1981), it was assumed as an extension
of

the

argument,

that

contracts with

disclaimers

would

bar

purchasers from rejecting a car even if it was delivered without
an engine.

However, that court erred in ignoring that a contract

requires that what is bargained-for is what is delivered.
other words,

if the car bargained-for

and

In

inspected had an

engine, the car delivered needed to have the same engine for the
contract to be valid.

Such was the situation in this case, in

which the automobile and engine bargaihed-for and inspected by
Mr. Hill were the automobile and engine delivered (R. 21-23, 7577) .

Additionally,

it

is

important

to

recognize

that

the

Illinois Appellate court noted that a buyer and seller still
needed to have the right to bargain-for each party's risks, and
that it was in no way attempting to pronibit or dishonor that
right as the defendant would have the court do in this matter.
Finally,

a

case

involving

a

typographical

mistake

in

printing business cards where the buyer l>ad inspected a sample of
the card, where neither party knew of the mistake until after
delivery, and where there was no mistake as to the identity of
the good sold and delivered, a mistake as to its character or
nature was held not to avoid the sale.

Giles Lithographic &

Liberty Printing Co. v. Chase, 149 Mass. 459, 21 N.E. 765 (1889).
Thus, a mistake relating to the good's quality is not sufficient
7

to authorize a court to rescind the contract, where the means of
information was equally open to both parties.
this

in mind, the plaintiff

Id. at 766.

With

should be no more responsible,

especially in an "as is" sale, than the future owner Mr. Hill in
discovering problems with the character of the automobile.

See,

Costello v. Svkes. 143 Minn. 109, 172 N.W. 907, 908 (1919).
While
shortly

it is unfortunate that the automobile broke down

after

mechanical

its purchase, according to the "as is" sale,

defects

and

repairs

were

not

the

plaintiff's

responsibility even if it had to be "brought back in a basket"
(R. 21-23, 57-58, 60).

Comment 7 in U.C.C. § 2-316 further

explains that in an "as is" sale, the buyer assumes the entire
risk for any mechanical defects and all necessary repairs.

The

defendant correctly contends that surely the plaintiff would not
sell a defective and inoperable vehicle (R. 102). The plaintiff
did not sell a defective and inoperable car, but rather sold a
used car, which could be expected to experience defects like all
cars,

which

conformed

to

the

"as

is" sale, and

which was

inspected for safety and operable when it was delivered to and
accepted by the defendant (R. 21-23, 75-77).
B.

The automobile was bargained-for,
accepted on an "As Is" basis.

Acceptance

of

goods

occurs

when

the

purchased,
buyer,

after

and
a

reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods, signifies to the
seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take them in
spite of their nonconformity.

U.C.A. § 70A-2-606(l)(a) (1980).

Further, pursuant to U.C.A. § 70A-2-513(l) (1980), the buyer has
the right before payment or acceptance to inspect the goods.
8

The

facts

are

undisputed

that

Ion December

17,

1985,

defendant—respondent, Mr. Hill had an opportunity to inspect and
drive the automobile before payment or acceptance, and he did so
asking that the wipers and the brakes be checked which they were.
Then, two days later, he inspected the automobile again and
decided to make payment and take acceptance. (R. 21-23, 75-77)
From these facts, it should be concluded that a two day period
provides a reasonable opportunity, for Wr. Hill, to inspect the
automobile or even have others inspect i[t for him before payment
or acceptance.
reasonable

Thus according to § 70A-2-606(l)(a), having had a

opportunity

to

inspect

th^

automobile,

Mr.

Hill

signified, by making payment, that the automobile was conforming
or that he would accept it in spite of i^s non-conformity.
The case before this court factually differs from the cases
cited by defendant in Zabrieski Chevrolet^, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J.
Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968) and ShejLton v. Farkas, 30 Wash.
App. 549, 635 P.2d 1109 (1981) in that i^nlike those cases, where
reasonable opportunity to inspect a new car didn't exist during
just a "spin around the block" or wher£ a qualified instructor
wasn't present to inspect the violin £nd the owners wouldn't
allow

it

out

of

the

store

without

purchase,

reasonable

opportunity to inspect or have others inspect for Mr. Hill did
exist during a two day period (R. 21-2£, 75-77).

Furthermore,

unlike this case, the goods in the casesj cited by defendant were
not sold on an "as is" basis, and therefore, were subject to
implied warranties of merchantability anc} fitness for purpose.
Mr. Hill's actions indicate that \|hen he left plaintiff's
9

car lot with the Rabbit, he had bargained-for, inspected or had
the opportunity to inspect, made payment, and accepted delivery
of the Rabbit on an "as is" basis and was responsible for all
mechanical

defects

and

future

repairs.

The

fact

that the

defendant became unhappy with the car does not indicate he didn't
receive what he bargained-for, an "as is" car, and that the car
didn't conform to the contract.
For the reasons stated in Argument I, showing that the
defendant, Mr. Hill, accepted delivery of a conforming car when
he drove it off the lot, summary judgment should be reversed.
II.

REVOCATION OP ACCEPTANCE OP THE AUTOMOBILE SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED BECAUSE THE AUTOMOBILE DID CONFORM TO THE CONTRACT.
In finding that defendant—respondent, Mr. Hill, accepted

delivery of the automobile, thereby precluding its rejection,
U.C.A § 70A-2-608(l) (b) (1980) allows for a buyer to revoke his
acceptance

of

non-conforming

goods

whose

non-conformity

substantially impairs its value to him if his acceptance was
induced by either 1) the difficulty of discovering the nonconformity before acceptance or 2) by the seller's assurances.
The first requirement under U.C.A. § 70A-2-608(1)(b) is that
the goods be found to be non-conforming.

The argument and the

facts set forth above establish that the automobile bargainedfor, purchased, and accepted by Mr. Hill conformed to the "as is"
contract that was signed by him.

Given that failure to show non-

conformity prohibits a revocation of an acceptance, this court
should rule that Mr. Hill cannot revoke the contract.

10

A.

The automobile's value was not substantially impaired.

However, if the court finds that the automobile was accepted
and that it did not conform to the contract, the burden of proof
is on the buyer to show whether the non-conformity substantially
impaired the car's value to him.

Whether goods are substantially

impaired is a question to be decided by the trier of fact.
Aubrey's R.V. Center v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d
1124, 1128 (1987) (citing Havs Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78
Wash. 2d 343, 347, 474 P.2d 270 (1970)); McGilbrav v. Scholfield
Winnebago, Inc., 221 Kan. 605, 561 P.2d 8|32 (1977).
In

analyzing

if

the

alleged

impairment

of

value

was

substantial to the defendant, contrary to defendant's position,
the necessary test involves the use of ai} objective standard with
reference to the buyer's particular circumstances, rather than
his unarticulated subjective desires. foibrey's R.V. Center, 4 6
Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d at 1128.
561 P.2d at 836.

See, McGilbray, 221 Kan. 605,

Again, the court in International Petroleum

Services, 230 Kan. 452, 639 P. 2d at 30;, stated that a buyer's
knowledge that the goods are used, the Extent of their use, and
whether they are discounted may help to determine what standards
of quality applied to the transaction.

Certainly, an objective

test of Mr. Hill's particular circumstances would indicate that
the purchase
expected

of an "as is" automobile

to require mechanical

should reasonably be

repair?, notwithstanding

when

those repairs became necessary.
Also

objectively

considering

Mr.

Hill's

particular

circumstances, including his need for transportation, since the
11

defendant did not present any factual information stating that
the automobile could not be repaired, it can be assumed that like
most

cars,

transportation

it

could
could

have
have

been
still

repaired.
been

Therefore,

provided,

without

substantial or lasting impairment, if Mr. Hill had fulfilled his
responsibility to repair the automobile.
B.

The mechanical defect has not been shown to have been
undiscoverable before acceptance.*

If the court did find the automobile non-conforming and that
its non-conformity had substantially impaired its value to the
defendant, it is still necessary for the defendant to show that
his acceptance was either induced because 1) the defect could not
have been discovered before acceptance or 2) because of the
seller's assurances.

While it is undisputed that Mr. Hill took

delivery of the car without knowledge of any mechanical defect
(R. 77-78), all that is mentioned by the defendant concerning the
car's mechanical defect is that the problem involved the drive
mechanism

(R. 79).

Certainly, the defendant, claiming that a

defect was undiscoverable before acceptance, should be required
to submit proof for such a claim including an exact determination
of the defect and why it was undiscoverable.
Furthermore, a mistake as to the nature or condition of a
car conforming to contract, as outlined in Argument I-A, does not
allow

a

contract

to

be

voidable

because

of

difficulty

in

discovering a defect where both parties were in an equally good
position to know of the defect.
459, 21 N.E. at 765.

Giles Lithographic, 149 Mass. at

This is especially persuasive in this "as

is" sale case. Mr. Hill, being able to inspect and drive the car
12

as much as desired for two days (R. 21-23, 75-77), had as good a
chance to discover the defect as the plaintiff did, especially
since the plaintiff had also received the car from someone else
(R. 24), and therefore, could not know oti all possible defects.
Also, public policy would encourage that sellers not be
required to know all the potential or existing problems with used
"as is" merchandise.

The costs for imposing this guarantee of

quality would be severe and would serve to limit the contractual
freedom of dividing the risks and costs between the buyers and
sellers.

The

plaintiff

should

not

be

responsible

for all

possible undiscoverable defects in this ^as is" sale.
Finally, defendant has not proven that the plaintiff made
assurances about the car's quality that lead to the defendant's
acceptance.

However, the fact that the plaintiff instructed the

defendant that the automobile was being gold "as is", and that he
would be responsible for the car even if it were "brought back in
a basket" (R. 21-23), indicates that th£ plaintiff did not make
any assurances of quality which could have been relied upon.
Also, the defendant signed both the contract and buyer's guide
which conspicuously stated that the dealor took no responsibility
for any repairs in spite of any oral statements (R. 57-58, 60).
For the reasons stated

in Argument II, summary judgment

should be reversed on finding that the automobile was conforming,
the automobile's value to the defendant was not substantially
impaired by the defect, and that the defendant's acceptance was
not induced by either the undiscoverability of the defect or by
seller's assurances.
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III. THE AUTOMOBILE WAS CONSIDERATION FOR THE PAYMENT AND THE
CONTRACT IS THEREFORE NOT VOIDABLE.
In a case directly on point to the present case, the court
in Yanish. 156 Colo. 225, 397 P. 2d at 882 was faced with a
complaint involving failure of consideration for an automobile,
sold "as is", that was entirely unworkable due to mechanical
defects.

The court ruled that there were no implied warranties,

in spite of any representations by the seller to the contrary,
and the complaint was dismissed because consideration did exist.
The situation is very similar in the case before this court.
No implied warranties were given because the automobile was sold
"as is", and Mr. Hill received what he bargained-for, an "as is"
car, thereby having received consideration for his payment.

In

concluding that consideration was received by Mr. Hill, summary
judgment should be reversed.
IV.

THE EXCLUSION OR DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES IN AN "AS IS" SALE
IS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE.
U.C.A. § 70A-2-316(l-3)

(Supp. 1987), provides that both

express and implied warranties may be disclaimed in a contract up
to the point that they are found unconscionable under U.C.A. §
70A-2-302 (1980).

In Resource Management Corp. v. Western Ranch

& Livestock Co. , 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme
Court

applied

U.C.A.

§ 70A-2-302

to

a non-U.C.C. case and

identified the principle for allowing unconscionability and the
various standards in which to test for unconscionability.
The principal or purpose of unconscionability

is one of

preventing oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance
of the allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.
14
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"1 •

mentioned was a test used in Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272,
275 P.2d 989 (1958), which asks whether the contract is one that
no

"decent,

fair-minded

person"

would

view

possessed of a profound sense of injustice.

without

being

And yet another test

used in Bekins, 664 P.2d at 462, requires that an unconscionable
contract show an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights
of

the

parties.

Procedurally,

tests

of

unconscionability

mentioned in Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1042, include a
take it or leave it basis, an absence of meaningful choice or a
lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation.
tests

are

then

considered

in

light

of

inequalities

bargaining power, incomprehensible contractual
general lack of sophistication of the party.

These procedural
in the

language, or a

Id.

In regards to the substantive tests outlined in Resource
Management, it follows that the "as is" contract bargained-for in
this case was not oppressive and didn't present unfair surprise.
Mr. Hill had two days to bargain-for, inspect, and accept the
automobile (R. 21-23, 75-77), and should not have been surprised
by an "as is" sales contract disclaiming all warranties.

The

buyer's guide, indicating an "as is" sale, was developed by the
FTC

and

establish

is

adopted

buyer

and

and

used

seller

by

car

dealerships

responsibilities.

to better

Public policy

argues that its use is essential to the commercial setting and
needs of the trade as explained in argument II-B.

Reaching the

same conclusion in Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson. Inc. , 130
Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210, 211 (1981), the court ruled a contract
was not unconscionable when a buyer would have had to purchase
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Summary judgment should be reversed in this case because the
"as is" contract should not be ruled unconscionable using any of
the various tests provided for by the Supreme Court of Utah.
Also, the right to disclaim warranties is allowed under U.C.A. §
70A-2-316(l-3) and is fundamental to the commercial setting and
needs of car sells, and therefore, should not be unconscionable.
V.

A CONTRACT CANNOT BE PROPERLY FOUND UNCONSCIONABLE ON A
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Utah courts have ruled that summary judgment should only be

granted when it is clear from the undisputed facts, viewed in a
light most favorable to the opposing party, that the opposing
party cannot prevail, Conder v. Williams, 61 Adv. Report 23 (Utah
Ct.

App.

6/25/87),

based

on

the

applicable

law.

Franklin

Financial v. New Empire Devel. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1985).
While

the

facts are basically undisputed

in this case, the

applicable law, based on the arguments stated above, favors the
plaintiff, and therefore, summary judgment should be reversed.
Furthermore, U.C.A.

§ 70A-2-302

(1980) provides

for the

determination of unconscionability as a matter of law in light of
the commercial setting and contractual provisions of the case.
The Code requires that a reasonable opportunity be afforded to
present such evidence to the court in making its determination.
As a result, it is improper for a court to decide an issue of
unconscionability on a motion for summary judgment without having
received evidence from the parties during trial.

Haugen v. Ford

Motor Co. . 219 N.W.2d 462, 464 (N.D. 1974); Butcher v. GarrettEnumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352, 1357 (1978).
18

CONCLUSION
The
mo L i o n

trial

lm

Minimal I

reasons

|iiili|im lull

' irst
rl

contract

undiMi

i m in i I "a q r a nt i n q

hy

11

o r had t h e

e

I

II

i

quality.

i
Also

e^

I In

IIHIIHOI

:

alli

I Ii I

outlined

\\\

the

|

i i unity

IIIIIII

I III mi

h'tiiis

accepted

wh 11 Ii

I I in

c :: lit* i an 1

was

„

.Ii II I i I I n

The p l a i n t i f f ,
this

Court

i c in I ' " i mi ni 11 ni

reverse

'

mi 11 ni

a1

ni I 1 owed

inspect,
Nnvt , the

"as

i

is 1 1

oither

1 1 1 11

caj

ir

» untract

I largained-foi

- inaliy,

dnos

not
s

uncons : l o n a c m ty

^-i^,^ .

. vpr.iif

* -ho

«=

:

consideration

tor

the

contra***

.

j

che

i :i :: t r n ill = ::i i in: i :::: :::)! i s c i :: i lat 11 e

M o u n t a i i i Motoi : s ,
trial

i n d u c e d by

-

court*

i in I n r c e d

the

is"

Hi mi 11 ni mi in i i I I i n

( mi 1 i I

iiiiiii I In

Utah Supreme c o u r t

I he

i

t o have o t h e r s

i i miil mi in I

i d e n t i l it ill

automobile

iJ i . 1 1 t s i ' t l in mi ni I

mi ! in mi

s h o u l d not bo rn 1 od upon i n summar"
reasons

11

w i r r "int i p *

I he a c c e p t a n c e was

« i i ii i i) i mi mi n
Mi

in

II 11 I I i n i i ill |

1 tie d e t e c t s u b s t a n t i a 1J y i mipa 11 ed t he

c a r ' 4 ? va* ie t o him and I h ill
-

ill

1 II in

I'M! I Vnlkswaqen Rabbit

d e f e n d a n t d id n o t show t h a t

\

oritoniied

mi ni i I I I n

|i|

HI l u i

IIIIMI" N M

nxcludinrj

a A - A J I I I II I I

himself

In

I molnh

i l n l m in m 1 iniii"

III i h

inspected

i'

Iniulil

i I i f e n d a n t # s - - r e sponden t' s

o1

court

r espectfully

requests

and d e n y d e f e n d a n t ' s

I»4 ni«' • i in t .

__.
_ ;;

Respectively submitted t h i s

H a r r i s and

i a v ~f Atrgbst

motion

r—r* , r k °7.

carter

M i c h a e l J* P e t r o
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f —
x^

that

'rrexiam

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Appellate Brief was mailed to the following, postage
prepaid the ^ £ ^'day of Auguafc* 1987.

HAROLD C. VERHAAREN and
MARK F. BELL, for:
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 484-6161

20

ADDENDUM

*>1

ADDENDUM "A*
"All III" MALUM CONTRACT

BUYERS GUIDu
IMPORTANT: Spokan promiaat ara difficult to anforca. Aak tha daalar to put all promiaaa In writing. Kaap this

. fr

f

\

\U.*r\

DLmiU

^

W M C U HAM I

U /

I

I IITOCi iMNMKff (Op*f«gll

WARRANTIES FOR THIS VEHICLE:

AS IS NO WARRANTY
YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. Tha daalar aaaumat no responsibility for any repair*
of any oral ttatamants about tha vehicle

.

ARRANTY
O FULL O LIMITED WARRANTY. Tha daalar will pay
he labor ai
% of tha pai ti foi
tha covarad ayatama that fail during tha warranty period. Aak tha daalar for a copy of tha warranty
documant for a full axplanation of warranty covaraga, exclusions, and tha dealer's rapair obligations.
Undar state law, "Implied warranties" may give you even mora rights.
SYSTEMS COVERED:

DURATION:

p3 SERVICE CONTRACT. A service contract la available at an extra charge on this vehicle. Aak for details aa to
covaraga, deductible, price, and exclusions. If you buy a service contract within 90 daya of tha time of sale, state
law "implied warranties" may grva you additional righta.
PRE PURCHASE INSPECTION: ASK THE DEALER IF YOU MAY HAVE THIS VEHICLE INSPECTED' ill I i: Il Il Il
MECHANIC EITHER ON OR OFF THE LOT.
SEE THE BACK OF THIS FORM for Important additional information, including a Mat of aoma major dafacta that
may occur In used motor vahietaa.

Below »? a list of some majoi^Jfects that may occur In u»ed mote
F/ame & Boc'*
Ff&- t c c : k s co-'fecVv« ^ e ' d i c *usted ttvc^g-

chicles.

. BraVe System
Pest r,ct f :rr. wrce- 3'essw?e jDCT spec.
N«^ e".c-3 u pesa' rese-v~ r?C* spec '
Dees HI.4 stct /e K ; e ;-. s t r a ^ " ' ' - i t C C T s c : .

C••« !t3K2pe excud - g r c r . a a* - pace
Crack-::? L : ; I > or head
Be'rs ^ ss.-.j ; - .noperas*?
K--o.?.: £•• r r i i i rfia'eJ tc c a - * ^ ^ :.?:<.-> a'C
p~? k fCGS

D ^ r o' ro'o- too tr- «\ »/*g- Specs.
L i - ' " . ; r- p s - •»» cK-ess 'F-T r*s- •? '22 :**r"
Fo*e „-. • - j t o p t - - * - . ; :- ea> - ;
S ' u c t j a .v m e c a - f c a pa1"!; oa~cQcJ

Ati^o'-ra-exhajs; d.scna'S6Trar.srr.iss or & Drne Shaft
! ~ ^ _ c e ' ' j ' d t . c ' o ' i e a i i g e . e ^ v d ^ - r ^ j see; a:/.
C*c\ ».c- or d ^ e ^ : w3se * " ' ; ' ' .-£ v:s P<_At"?"~~?' n * ; ?e ?* v»bra?5o'' C2'j??f try ?a,j,ty v~rM?,~,?*>,?r

Steering System
Tc: - j r '.-€-• c ' : , ©' s , £ -f - : « ' £ - -.?C~ s r - : =
F'ee p'i> •' ; -KuCic f r e e mar". «inch
£•---•5 ^ v t " C s o ' j a ~ s
Pc-Ae- „n • reft.-. ;rac"frc: c- s:-pp ~J
rcvi-f-- / : ' : d ;e»r! ~ > : p e '

C C V€ S^Sf

Manuai clutch £ ps c charters
Differential
frr; 'Cfe* f - cf ?e.-e' cr !ea*>ag? e-'c'j:?"-; r c r ; see^ige

Suspension
Be ljo ; t5'-3 : 8d?~'aaed
S t r j c t - ' a ' & s t : rents'-dc.-.-sgei
StaL \ : e ta-a.ic^rne:te-j
S^-•.^ aL-scroer rrou°i-r.g 'ciac

Coottn<j System
Jr..;,: j p e \ . lor.cLo.i.r.y *a'.c, pwrv.p
Electrics! Systs-n
E.^e . ;ea..i-;€I n v e r t , ?--:-:o'=-s

i*:

3erc-2Vj tr^e'v estate

Fue! System
Vis.ti'e <ea>.3Cfc

S^iC<«^ 3wji'iC <c«»*\..'.C; c: !«r.c5.or.,r.^ i.T.p<'cpc'>y
T/res
Trfad.oe^!!-less tr.aa 2/32 'icfi
Sizes i r i s ^ a t c e d
\/»» Die aarr.age
WheeU
•\/'S--t-e cracKs. damage o r res3 -s
f/c j - * -.c tC'tts '.cose 0' rr.'ss -5

Inoperable Accessories
Gauges or warn.ng de..ces
Air condittone^
Heater & Defroster

Exhaust System
Leanage

SCE FOR COMPLAINTS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS BUYERS GUIDE.

x 'OA*X pjfl

,- /^i^^r

CUSTOMER SIGNATURE

DATE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form is part of any contract to buy this vehicle. Removal of this label before
consumer purchase (except for purpose of test-driving) Is a violation of federal law (16.C.F.R. 455).
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ADDENDUM
STATUTORY

II Ml IOV I li 11 HIM

I | II ' 1111 i
n I

»B»
(illllil II

I l l l ft IN! Ill11 III I II iP Il IMIII

lief i mi 1 lions • - "Co^formi ng"

to Centrist

Goods or conduct including any part of a performance
are "conforming" or conform to the contract when they
are in accordance with
th = obligations under
the
contract.

§ 70A-2-302

(1980):

Unconscionable contract or clause.

ml i
n

If the cour t as a matt-::
=
« '
: f'ra ** *
any clause of the contract to have Deen ancor ;:ionr
at the time it was made the court may reiuse t , erf:,
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder :„! z.%
contract without the unconscionable clause, ^r
it may
so limit the application of any u n c o n s . 4 ~ ^ K
^^JS^
as to avoid any unconscionable result,

(2)

when it is :::: Ill = i m = ::i :::: r appears luu
: *.•^ i contract or ai i;; ::: .] ai use thereof may be uncoi - o i
the parties sha ] Ill be afforded a reasonable of ortunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to a :i d the court in making the
determinat ion.

,A-2-3:LX_

_,

x__jrir.

):

Exclusion

modification

of

warranties,
(1)

Words or ,:c ndact. relevant * ':,-•:•
riti... of an exp;
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or
limit warranty sha1. be construed wherever reasonab-"
as consistent with ea,.h other; but subject to
provisions of this chapter
on parol or
extrinsic
evidence (section 70A-2-202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is
unreasonable.

f "»)

Subject "". subsection (
exclude or modii .
implied warranty of mercl
• ; ity or any part of
the language must mention merchantability and in t-.t
case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude
or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion
must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Language to
exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient
i£
it
states,
for
example,
that
"There
are
no
warranties which extend beyond the description oi I the
face hereof."

(3)

Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a)

unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all
implied warranties are excluded by expressions
like "as is", "with faults" or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that there is no implied warranty; and

(b)

when the buyer before entering into the contract
has examined the goods or the sample or model as
fully as he desired or has refused to examine the
goods there is no implied warranty with regard to
defects
which
an
examination
ought
in
the
circumstances to have revealed to him; and

(c)

an implied warranty can also be excluded
modified by course of dealing or course
performance or usage of trade,

70A-2-513(l) (1980):
(1)

or
of

Buyer's right to inspection of goods.

Unless otherwise agreed and subject to subsection (3),
where goods are tendered or delivered or identified to
the contract for sale, the buyer has a right before
payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable
place and time and in any reasonable manner. When the
seller is required or authorized to send the goods to
the buyer, the inspection many be after their arrival.

70A-2-601 (1980):

Buyer's rights on improper delivery.

Subject to the provisions of this chapter on breach in
installment contracts (§ 70A-2-612) and unless otherwise
agreed under the sections on contractual limitations of
remedy (§ 70A-2-718 and § 70A-2-719) , if the goods or the
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the
contract, the buyer may (a) reject the whole; or (b) accept
the whole; or (c) accept any commercial unit or units and
reject the rest.
70A-2-606(l)(a) (1980):
(1)

What constitutes acceptance of goods.

Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a)

after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the
goods signifies to the seller that the goods are
conforming or the he will take or retain them in
spite of their nonconformity; or

B-2

§ 70A-2-608 (1 ) (1 : ) (1980) :
i n part ,
(::i )

Revocation c i : acceptance 1 ill 1 ile or

The bu
'
ceptance o r
2 c: " or
commercial unit whose nonconformity
substantially
impairs its value to him if he hgs accepted it
i without discovery of such nonconformity if his
acceptance was reasonably induced either by the
difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by
the seller's assurances.

